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Abstract This study concerns an aspect of the reception of Herbatianism in Austria which 
has not been thoroughly investigated so far. It pertains to a controversy opposing Robert 
Zimmermann and Franz Brentano in the context of discussions that took place in the 
Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna. This study looks more specifically at 
three important episodes involving the Philosophical Society: first, the controversy over 
Herbartianism, second, that over the evaluation of Schelling’s philosophy, and finally, the 
reception of Bolzano in Austria. I will first describe the circumstances that led 
Zimmermann to get involved in the Philosophical Society and the source of his controversy 
with Brentano and his followers. I will then comment on Zimmermann’s address as 
chairman of the Philosophical Society and Brentano’s reaction to Zimmermann’s remarks 
on Schelling and the historical period to which he belongs. I will complete my analysis of 
Brentano’s reaction with a summary of his evaluation of Herbart’s philosophical program 
to which Zimmermann adhered. The last part focuses on Zimmermann’s decisive role in 
the reception of Bolzano in Vienna in connection with the Bolzano Commission 
established by the Philosophical Society. I will conclude with brief remarks on 
Zimmermann’s legacy in Vienna. 
 
Introduction 
In “My Last wishes to Austria,” written just before he left Vienna in 1895, Franz Brentano 
describes the state of philosophy in Austria when he arrived in Vienna in 1874: 
I came in a time when it had become completely clear about the emptiness of 
pompously inflated doctrinal systems, but where the seeds of true philosophy were 
still almost entirely lacking. The minister Ausperg (Stremayr) believed that he 
found in me the man who was most suitable for bringing such a germ to Austria. I 
was called and I followed the call. I found the situation extremely sad: a Herbartian 
doctrine, but no Herbartian school (the hour had already passed for them); and that 
nothing was everything (Brentano 1895a, p. 64).1 
 
Brentano undertook to implant the seed of an authentic philosophy through his program of 
philosophy as science, which he first exposed publicly in his inaugural address at the 
University of Vienna in 1874 (Brentano 1929a). Brentano’s efforts were very successful 
                                               
• Thanks to Carole Maigné for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.  
1 Brentano describes the situation in the same terms in a letter to Hugo Bergmann dated June 1, 1909 in 
which he adds the names of Franz K. Lott and Anton Günther (Brentano 1946, p. 125). 
 
considering that, after his departure from Vienna, most of the important chairs of 
philosophy in the Habsburg Empire were occupied by his students. But to achieve this goal, 
it was first necessary to dislodge Herbart’s followers who, after the reform of 1849, held 
key positions in Austrian universities. Besides Brentano, who replaced Franz Karl Lott, an 
influential disciple of Herbart in Vienna (see Dahms, forthcoming; Dahms, H.-J. & F. 
Stadler 2015, pp. 83-88), his student Carl Stumpf took over Wilhelm F. Volkmann’s chair 
in 1879, another influential disciple of Herbart in Prague. The following year, Anton Marty 
obtained Johann Heinrich Loewe’s chair, which marks the beginning of the school of 
Brentano in Prague that lasted until the late 1930s. Finally, Alois Höfler, a student of 
Brentano and Meinong, replaced two influential disciples of Herbart in Austria, namely 
Otto Willmann in Prague in 1903, and Theodor Vogt in Vienna in 1907. 
 
One of the main proponents of Herbartianism in Austria, to whom Brentano refers in the 
excerpt above, is Robert von Zimmermann, who held a chair of philosophy at the 
University of Vienna from 1861 to 1896. Zimmermann began his studies in philosophy by 
attending Bolzano’s lectures in Prague, and he then turned to Franz Serafin Exner, a student 
and supporter of Herbart, to supervise his dissertation in Prague in 1846. In 1849, 
Zimmermann was habilitated by Franz Karl Lott in Vienna, and in the same year, he 
inherited the extraordinary professor chair at Olmütz, a position he would keep until 1852, 
just before his appointment in Prague for a chair of ordinary professor. In 1861, he returned 
to Vienna where he was appointed ordinary professor. After Brentano’s resignation from 
his chair in 1880, Zimmermann spent more than fifteen years in Vienna as the only full 
professor in the philosophy department and he therefore had to assume most of the 
administrative tasks. He also assumed the position of Rector of the University of Vienna 
during the 1866-1867 academic year, and he contributed to the foundation of two important 
societies in Vienna, namely the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna in 1888 
and the Grillparzer Society the following year. After 35 years of loyal service in Vienna, 
he was appointed professor emeritus in 1896. He died on August 31, 1898 in his hometown 
of Prague.2 
                                               
2 There are several biographies on Zimmermann, including these: Jahresberichte 11, 1897-1898; E. Reich 
1899; H. Spitzer 1900.  
During the thirty years he spent in Vienna, Zimmermann taught philosophy to most 
students in the Faculty of Philosophy, and the influence he has had on some of them is due 
in part to the fact that he was, for a long period, the only examiner (Prüfer) in the 
philosophy department. He is known to have taught the composer Gustav Mahler and the 
physicist Ludwig Boltzmann, for example, and he had a great deal of influence on the art 
theorist and leader of the Vienna School of Art History, Alois Riegl (see Gubser 2006; 
Trautmann-Waller 2009, Wiesing 2016), as well as on the classical music theorist Eduard 
Hanslick (Zimmermann 1885; Blaukopf 2000, 1995, Payzant 2002). Most of Brentano’s 
students, including Husserl3 and K. Twardowski,4 attended Zimmermann’s lectures. 
Moreover, Zimmermann left us a rich and diversified contribution to several areas of 
philosophy, including the history of philosophy in Germany and Austria5 and the field of 
aesthetics, in which he became known for his anti-idealist orientation (see Zimmermann, 
1854) and his defence of aesthetic formalism inspired by Herbart.6 Indeed, several aspects 
of Zimmermann’s philosophy are known today thanks to the long-lasting influence of his 
work in the field of aesthetics and to recent studies on this important aspect of his work.7 
This study concerns an aspect of the reception of Herbatianism in Austria which has not 
been thoroughly investigated so far. It pertains to a controversy opposing Robert 
Zimmermann and Franz Brentano in the context of discussions that took place in the 
Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna. I am mostly interested in three important 
episodes in the history of philosophy in Vienna that involve the Philosophical Society: first, 
                                               
3 In his mathematical curriculum from 1881 to 1883, the young Husserl studied philosophy in Vienna as a 
second discipline and it was then that he was examined in philosophy by Zimmermann and Vogt (see 
Rollinger, 1999, 16 sq.). But as Brentano pointed out to Stumpf in a letter from October, 18, 1886 on the 
occasion of his recommendation of Husserl to Stumpf in Halle, Husserl has in no way been influenced by 
Zimmermann (Brentano & Stumpf, 2014, p.260). However, P. Varga (2015, p.101) claims that Zimmermann 
had for the young Husserl “die gleiche Bedeutung” as Brentano! 
4 Twardowski (2017, p. 2) explicitly acknowledged Zimmermann’s influence on his thought.  
5 Let us note his marked interest, in his early publications and in three academic addresses in Prague, Olmütz, 
and Vienna, in the philosophy of Leibniz (Zimmermann, 1847, 1849b) (Zimmermann (1850, 1852b, 1861). 
Let us also mention his numerous studies published in the session reports of the Vienna Academy of Sciences, 
including those on Kant and Auguste Comte (Zimmermannn 1886, 1874) as well as his numerous reviews, 
from 1870 to 1898, of the German philosophical literature for the British journal Athenaeum. 
6 See especially Zimmermann (1858, 1865). For a detailed exposition of Zimmermann’s aesthetics and art 
history, and his discussions on the musical aesthetics of his time, see Blaukopf 1995, 1997, 2000; on 
Zimmermann’s critique of the aesthetics of the Hegelians, see Zimmermann 1854; on his program of an 
aesthetic as science, see Zimmermann 1862.   
7 There are many valuable works on Zimmermann’s aesthetic, including the recent work of C. Maigné (2017) 
and some collective works on formalism in aesthetics: Maigné 2013; Maigné & Trautmann-Waller (eds.) 
2009; see also Gubser 2006; Wiesing 2016; Moro 2009; Paysant, 2002.  
the controversy over Herbartianism, second, that over the evaluation of Schelling’s 
philosophy, and finally, the reception of Bolzano in Austria. I will first describe the 
circumstances that led Zimmermann to become involved in the Philosophical Society and 
the source of his controversy with Brentano and his followers. I will then comment on 
Zimmermann’s address as chairman of the Philosophical Society and Brentano’s reaction 
to Zimmermann’s remarks on Schelling and the historical period to which he belongs. I 
will complete my analysis of Brentano’s reaction with a summary of his evaluation of 
Herbart’s philosophical program, to which Zimmermann adhered. The last part focuses on 
Zimmermann’s decisive role in the reception of Bolzano in Vienna in connection with the 
Bolzano Commission created by the Philosophical Society. I will conclude with several 
brief remarks on Zimmermann’s legacy in Vienna. 
 
1. Zimmermann and the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna 
Let us first introduce this venerable institution which has been a privileged witness of the 
evolution of the history of philosophy in Austria and the theatre of many discussions, 
including that between Zimmermann and Brentano (Fisette 2014). The Philosophical 
Society of the University of Vienna owes its creation to Brentano’s seminars taught to a 
large public composed of philosophers and non-philosophers of all horizons.8 The 
circumstances surrounding this foundation are described in detail in several annual reports 
of the Society and by some of its members.9 Although the names associated with most of 
its founding members are Brentano’s students and, for the most part, sympathizers of 
Meinong’s philosophy in Graz,10 this organization would not have been recognized as a 
                                               
8 Alois Höfler, a philosophy student of Brentano and Meinong, provides further information about Brentano’s 
lectures from which the Society originates (Höfler 1917). Another important testimony regarding the origins 
of the Philosophical Society is that of K. Twardowski in his autobiography, in which he mentions, in addition 
to Brentano’s lectures, a reading group composed of Brentano’s students, including Hans Schmidkunz, Alois 
Höfler, Christian von Ehrenfels, and Josef Kreibig who met regularly to discuss Aristotle’s texts 
(Twardowski 2017, p.5). These four philosophers have been the most active members in the activities of the 
Society.  
9 See in particular Jahresbericht 1912-1913, pp. 3-4; 1888, p. 1). 
10 But Meinong’s name does not figure in these testimonies, and the day after the official foundation of the 
Society, Meinong wrote to Höfler: “I can hardly imagine that he could have silently invented a philosophical 
society without even letting me know a word about it” (Meinong an Höfler. 23.2.1888, Meinung-Nachlaß, 
Karton LV, Nr.4503). His friend Höfler quickly corrected this situation by adding Meinong’s name to the list 
of the first members of the Society. Meinong maintained his membership in the Society until his death in 
1918 (Dölling 1999, p. 74). 
society of the University of Vienna without the support of several professors from the 
Faculty of Philosophy. This is because at that time Brentano’s academic position as a 
lecturer in Vienna since 1880 and his tense relations with the ministry deprived him of all 
academic power and his support to this initiative was merely moral. This academic support 
came initially from two influential members of the Faculty of Philosophy, namely the 
psychiatrist Theodor Meynert (1833-1892), a close collaborator of Brentano and Freud, 
and one of the founding members of the Society,11 and Zimmermann, who was in 1888 the 
only ordinary professor in the philosophy department, and who held the position of Rector 
of the University of Vienna during the academic year prior to the foundation of the Society. 
In several of the Society’s annual reports, including the one marking its tenth anniversary, 
Zimmermann’s contribution is highlighted: 
Since 1889, Zimmermann was chairman of the Philosophical Society, which owes 
him valuable advice and claims since its foundation. It was counsellor Zimmermann 
who, at the founding of the Society (in spring 1888), represented the interests and 
needs of the Philosophical Society in the high academic senate of the University of 
Vienna in the warmest and most convincing manner, and only thereby enabled to 
bear the title “Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna” more than just by 
name. [...] The connection between the Philosophical Society and the University, 
which was thus formally achieved, was a reference not to be underestimated for the 
organization of the membership and the scientific activities of the Society 
(Jahresbericht 1912-1913, p. 3).12 
 
During the Society’s first year of existence, Alois Höfler presided mainly because of his 
competences in the sciences and philosophy, but also because, like most of the other 
founding members of the Society, Höfler was closely related to Meinong. This student of 
Boltzmann and Stefan could thus serve as a mediator in the exchanges within the 
Philosophical Society between scientists and philosophers. But after only three semesters, 
Höfler resigned as chairman due to overwork (Höfler 1921, p. 10) and he was replaced by 
                                               
11 In a lecture delivered to the Philosophical Society on the occasion of Meynert’s death, Höfler (1892, p.6) 
emphasized the importance of his central contribution to this organization not only through his lectures and 
his active participation in the evening discussions, but also as a scientist interested in philosophical issues. 
Meynert’s active participation in the Society had in fact a driving effect on several other scientists from the 
Faculty of Philosophy who decided to join the Society.  
12 Compare with the first annual report in which Zimmermann is warmly thanked “for the effective 
representation of the Society’s interests within the academic senate, and the high academic authorities for the 
trust which they granted to the newly founded Society by granting a space to the philosophical faculty” 
(Jahresbericht 1888, p.6). 
Zimmermann, who would chair the Philosophical Society from 1889 until his retirement 
in 1896. 
In addition to presiding over the Society during this late period in his career, Zimmermann 
gave a few lectures, the most important of which, for our purposes, are that on the occasion 
of his appointment as chairman of the Society on November 16, 1889, and that on the 
occasion of his 70th birthday (Zimmermann 1893-1894, pp. 5-8). He also delivered some 
lectures, the first of which, in 1889, on the beginnings of mathematical psychology in 
Vienna (Zimmermann 1889a), a second on the aesthetics of G. Semper (1893), and the 
third on Spinoza’s politics (1895). His first lecture on the beginnings of mathematical 
psychology in Vienna is typical of his treatises on the history of philosophy. He claimed 
that Herbart was not the first, with his mathematical psychology, to have applied 
mathematics to psychology. Wolf and the young Kant during his pre-critical period had 
already shown that one could quantify over the properties of mental phenomena. But 
Zimmermann was particularly interested in an Austrian precursor of mathematical 
psychology named Joseph Misley,13 namely “because he belongs to Austria, and in the 
narrow sense, to Vienna itself, and yet or perhaps for that very reason has remained almost 
unknown by his real name” (Zimmermann, 1889a, p. 3).14 Herbart nevertheless remains 
for Zimmermann “the first and true instigator in the exact sense of mathematical 
psychology” (Zimmermann 1889a, p. 5). 
 
2. The controversy over the name of the Philosophical Society 
Several indications show that there were overt tensions in Vienna between, on the one 
hand, Zimmermann as a supporter of Herbart’s philosophy and, on the other hand, 
Brentano and his followers. The first clues can be found in two reports of the Philosophical 
Society which clearly indicate that the source of this conflict lay in Zimmermann’s bias in 
favour of Herbart’s philosophy and his endeavour to impose his views on the Philosophical 
Society.15 In the first report, which highlights the 70th anniversary of Zimmermann’s birth, 
                                               
13 The Viennese Joseph Misley was the author of a book on the application of mathematics to purely mental 
objects (Misley 1818). This book was considerably expanded in the following years, the last edition dating 
from 1830. 
14 By “his real name” because, as Zimmermann (1889a, p. 3) points out in this article, Ribot (1879, p. 35) 
misspelled his real name by calling him Riesley.  
15 On Zimmermann's program for a renewal of philosophy in Austria, see M. Seiler (2009). 
the theologian L. Müllner, then Rector of the University of Vienna, discusses some 
rumours related to two major conflicts within the Philosophical Society, namely a bias 
towards Herbartianism and the status of philosophy as science: 
When the Philosophical Society of the University of Vienna was founded, many 
saw in it the creation of a party; and if that were the case, then the rumour would 
probably have been right that it was not the Herbart school that was supposed to 
rule it. They had in their hands the responsibility whether the young society would 
find a firm place at the first university of the empire: and you have carelessly 
considered sufficient to foster, without considering any other point of view and with 
the serious express intention, philosophy as science and only as such, in order to 
promote the granting of premises to the Society by the high academic senate 
(Jahresberichte 1893-1894, p. 12). 
 
Müllner knew for sure that it was not merely a rumour, as confirmed by the Society’s 25th-
anniversary report, which emphasizes the monopoly of Herbart’s philosophy since the 
reform of education. J. K. Kreibig, a student of Brentano and one of the authors of this 
report, welcomed the opportunity, twenty-five years after the foundation of the Society, to 
more freely discuss Zimmermann’s peculiar attitude towards the Philosophical Society in 
general and philosophy in particular: 
Since the reform of high and middle schools around the year 1850, Herbartianism 
had become as much the official philosophy in Austria as Hegelianism had been in 
Prussia. However, in the decade when our Society was founded, such a monopoly 
had become more and more outdated. In the axis of this reversal were the person of 
Zimmermann, on the one hand, and Franz Brentano with his numerous pupils, on 
the other hand, as if they were two poles. Even though the independent thinking of 
those pupils had developed far beyond the doctrine of their teacher, so that there 
could no longer be any talk of a unified “Brentano School,” they were nevertheless 
considered, from the outside - especially by Brentano’s enlightened opponents - as 
forming a homogeneous group. Even if the first instigators and participants of the 
Society had never tried to give it a one-sided character - incidentally, adherents of 
completely different philosophies soon joined our circle from outside - 
Zimmermann had ample opportunity, simply through the composition of the 
membership, to use his full objectivity and also his good will. We may say today 
that this spirit of impartiality at once has remained the good scientific spirit of our 
Society (Jahresberichte1912-1913, pp. 6-7). 
Kreibig claims that the motivation of Brentano’s students in this conflict with Zimmermann 
was in no way to substitute one school for another, since, as this excerpt makes clear, there 
was, strictly speaking, no “Brentano school” in Vienna.16 In addition, there were open 
conflicts between Brentano and Meinong, and between Meinong and Brentano’s most 
orthodox students, namely Anton Marty in Prague, to name only a few. 
One of the sources of this controversy lies in the name of the Philosophical Society, as 
Alfred Kastil, a student of Marty in Prague, later confirmed in one of the last lectures 
delivered before the Philosophical Society in 1936, under the title “Franz Brentanos Kritik 
der Antimetaphysiker,” which is a reflection on the state of philosophy in Vienna nearly 
fifty years after the foundation of the Society (Kastil forthcoming). The first part of his 
talk focuses precisely on the Brentano-Zimmermann controversy and Brentano’s lecture 
on Schelling (Brentano 1929c). Kastil confirms that what triggered this controversy lay in 
Zimmermann’s reluctance to append the term “scientific” to the name of the Society17 and 
the fact that he would have used all his authority, as Brentano confirms in his talk on 
Schelling, to make sure that the term “scientific” be banned forever from its program 
(Brentano 1929c, p. 131). Zimmermann’s manoeuvre was indirectly intended to be against 
the philosophical program advocated by Brentano and his followers of philosophy as 
science (see Fisette, forthcoming 2), and we shall see that this controversy goes far beyond 
a semantic issue.  
 
3. Zimmerman’s address on the occasion of his 70th birthday 
The other source of this controversy is Zimmermann’s inaugural address as chairman of 
the Society, delivered on November 16, 1889, (Jahresbericht 1889-1890, p. 2) to which 
Brentano reacted a month later in his talk on Schelling. Although Zimmermann’s address 
was not published in the Jahresberichte, Brentano’s critical remarks in his lecture on 
                                               
16 Indeed, after his departure from Vienna in 1895, Brentano’s name is mentioned nowhere in the Society’s 
annual reports, and unlike most members of the Society, his death in 1917 was not even mentioned in the 
annual reports or in the meetings of the Society. Later, A. Kastil, a student of Marty in Prague, would deliver 
lectures on Brentano in the Philosophical Society. Nevertheless, Brentano’s correspondence shows that he 
was aware of the activities of the Philosophical Society after 1895 and was aware of the controversy 
surrounding his succession in Vienna (Fisette, 2014). 
17 Kastil wrote: “Zimmermann was not as alone in that judgment as he seemed to think. And so he did not 
advertise in vain to recognize in these heroes a certain equality to the sober research of his time. It was 
suggested, in order not to give rise to the spirit of those a priori systematisers, to include the word ‘scientific’ 
in the title of the Society. It should be called the Society of Scientific Philosophy but his authority had 
enforced the rejection of the proposal, so that it remained simply a philosophical society” (Kastil, 
forthcoming, p. 003566). 
 
Schelling contain several references to Zimmermann’s talk that allow for several overlaps 
with the other address delivered by Zimmermann some years later, again before the 
Philosophical Society, on the occasion of his 70th birthday (Zimmermann 1893-1894). 
Brentano’s references also help establish several links with Zimmermann’s historical 
studies published during the same period (Zimmermann 1888-1889, 1888, 1886). This 
controversy relates more specifically to two divergent views on the history of philosophy 
in the nineteenth century, and it derives more specifically from Zimmermann’s remarks in 
his address regarding the status and place of Schelling and Kantianism in the history of 
philosophy. This presumably constitutes Zimmermann’s motivation in his opposition to 
the formulation of the title of the Society and that of Brentano in the choice of his 
conference’s topic as he confirms in this quote: “I did not choose Schelling simply because 
our dear President [Zimmermann] has named him in particular but also because he 
represents most typically the philosophy of this bygone era” (Brentano 1929c, p. 105). 
The subject of this dispute pertains to the evaluation of this period in the history of 
philosophy to which Schelling’s philosophy belongs, and which Zimmermann describes as 
a golden age of philosophy, as shown by the following excerpt from Brentano’s lecture: 
It is a fact that there cannot really be any stronger contrast than between great glory 
and deep contempt. And we understand the nostalgia well with which our esteemed 
President, at our last assembly, turned his eyes to the past time saying that the 
golden age of our German literature had also been that of the golden age of German 
philosophy, and he told us how much it affected him during his youth, and how he 
had still been able to look into Schelling’s eyes, one of the epoch-making thinkers 
(Brentano 1929c, p. 104). 
 
We shall see that, for Brentano at least, the stake of this controversy lies in his philosophy 
of history and his theory of the four phases in the history of philosophy. 
That said, in this address, Zimmermann describes himself “as a living witness of half a 
century of the development of philosophy”:  
I participated in this change, I saw the last glow of the Hegelian school with my 
own eyes; I saw the break happen within the school. I saw with my own eyes the 
last hero of the heroic age of philosophy, Schelling. I saw him in his youth and his 
eyes still sparkling despite his old age (Jahresbericht 1895-1896, p. 8).18 
 
                                               
18 Compare with his inaugural address in Vienna (Zimmermann, 1861, p.5) in which Zimmermann says 
substantially the same thing. 
But Vienna and Austria are not appanages of Germany in terms of culture and philosophy 
when one considers “that the city, which gave birth to a poet such as Grillparzer, a painter 
such as Schwind, composers like Schubert, gave a second home to Gluck, Haydn, Mozart, 
and Beethoven, and despite the circumstances, does not deserve any inglorious 
participation in the German science.” (Zimmermann 1886, p. 28).  
However, Vienna’s contribution to German philosophy largely depends on the Viennese 
philosopher Karl Leonhard Reinhold,19 to whom Zimmermann assigns a central place in 
the history of post-Kantian philosophy in Germany. In his inaugural address as Rector of 
the University of Vienna, which mainly stresses Reinhold’s contribution, Zimmermann 
(1886, p. 40) even considers him “the second scholar of German philosophy,” the first 
being Kant. Kant’s philosophy obviously comes first because it represents the threshold of 
German philosophy: “Kant’s philosophy is like the threshold on which you cannot stand 
still, but which one must have taken. Only the one who went through the gates of it is in 
the hallway of contemporary philosophy, which is still in the process of being built (1886, 
32).20 Whatever Reinhold’s merits and contribution to Kantianism and the history of 
German philosophy, his connection with Austrian philosophy is rather thin and it is 
questionable whether he is truly representative of Austria’s contribution to the history of 
philosophy in the nineteenth century.  
Nevertheless, Zimmermann’s treatises on the history of philosophy in Austria contain a 
wealth of first-hand information on the main figures in the making of Austrian 
philosophy.21 Among the important figures in Zimmermann’s narrative, the most 
significant is undoubtedly Bolzano, who represented, for the history of philosophy in 
Austria, what Kant represented for German philosophy during many decades. 
                                               
19 In his correspondence with Marty, Brentano wrote about Zimmermann’s inaugural address as Rector: 
“Zimmermann has recently held his inaugural address as Rector. But was it good? According to the reports 
I received – who was not present -, it seems doubtful. He talked about Vienna’s contributions to the history 
of philosophy and especially about a man who is not honored enough, a pure, sweet soul [Reinhold = rein 
hold]. And who was, he asked, this pure graceful (Holde)? It was Reinhold! At least Hartl, who made a lot 
of fun of this handy illustration of Zimmermann’s Aesthetic. Maybe it's a fable, and we do well to wait for 
the print of the speech” (Brentano, Brief an Marty, 28-10-86). 
20 “Even though Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason is perhaps the key to philosophy, it is not philosophy itself” 
(Zimmermann 1886, p. 37). On the reception of Kant via Herbart, see Zimmermann 1882. 
21 In his 1888 article “Wissenschaft und Literatur,” which bears on the history of philosophy in Austria, 
Zimmermann briefly discusses most of the important figures in the history of philosophy in Austria, from 
Bolzano to his contemporaries. 
Zimmermann acknowledges the major influence that Bolzano had on him and the history 
of philosophy in Austria (1893-1894, p.7) and maintains that he is at the origin of a 
significant tradition in the history of philosophy in Austria. But in this work, at least, he 
merely evokes the memory of the author of Wissenschaftslehre who initiated him to 
philosophy: 
When we turn the focus towards the professorship here and in Prague in earlier 
times, then other pictures appear before our eyes, and Bolzano’s venerable figure 
shines forth in the midst of his auditors full of admiration, and dominated not only 
the minds, but also the souls; he had a major and lasting influence - the traces are 
still apparent today; but he was taken away from them because he was forced to 
resign from his professorship after a sixteen-year career, never to enter it again 
(Zimmermann 1893-1894, p. 7).22 
That said, Zimmermann is best known as the most important advocate of Herbart’s 
philosophy in nineteenth-century Austria.23 As he repeatedly points out, one of the most 
significant moments in the development of philosophy in Austria was the reform of 
education in 1849 that the ministry entrusted to Count Leo Thun, who was also a close 
friend and the sponsor of Bolzano, and Franz Serafin Exner, a student and disciple of 
Herbart. The aim of this reform was to secularize philosophy in educational institutions 
and to implant Herbart’s philosophy in Austria just as the Prussians did a few years earlier 
with Hegel’s philosophy. Zimmermann also saw in his master Exner the “founder of a 
Herbart school in Austria,” and the “counselor and friend of the leaders of the first Ministry 
of Education in Austria, v. Chr. Feuchtersleben and Count Leo Thun, together with 
likeminded men such as J. A. Zimmermann, Bonitz, Lott, who became the intellectual 
instigators of the radical reform of higher education” (Zimmermann 1888, p. 146).24 It is 
known that this reform also made it possible to disseminate Bolzano’s ideas thanks, among 
other things, to Zimmermann’s Philosophical Propaedeutic which, for several decades, 
became the canonical textbook of philosophy throughout the Habsburg Monarchy. In 
                                               
22 See Zimmermann 1888-1889, pp. 184-198 and 1849a for a detailed description of Bolzano’s life and 
work.  
23 On Herbart’s influence on Zimmermann’s philosophy, see Zimmermann (1871, 1872, 1873, 1876, 1877) 
and Bauer (1966).  
24 However, in the fourth part of the study „Philosophie und Philosophen in Österreich” in which 
Zimmermann examines the outlines of the philosophy of his teacher Exner, he stresses again the importance 
of the reform of philosophy in Austria but denies this time that this reform was aimed at implanting the 
philosophy of Herbart in Austria (Zimmermann 1888-1889, p. 246). On Zimmermann and the reform of 
education, see Payzant, 2002. 
addition to Bolzano and Exner, Zimmermann also stresses the name of the theologian and 
philosopher Anton Günther, another student of Bolzano, who also exercised much 
influence in Austria (Zimmermann 1888, p. 146) .25 
Zimmermann did not pay much attention to contemporary philosophy in this address, but 
he claims elsewhere (Zimmermann, 1888-1889) that the main trend in philosophy at that 
time was decidedly empiricist and he emphasizes in this regard the contribution of his 
colleagues from the Medical School “where both the realistic school of Herbart and the 
Vienna School of Medicine, which was based on an empirical foundation, had paved the 
way, in a grandiose manner and more than anywhere else, to the same approach in the 
foundation and method of experience” (Zimmermann 1888-1889, p. 268; Lesky 1976). On 
the other hand, Zimmermann also expresses his reservations regarding his colleagues’ 
empiricist orientation: 
Philosophically trained Vienna naturalists such as Rokitansky, Stricker, Meynert 
among others, have set the tone: thinkers familiar and friendly with Comte’s 
positive philosophy and the inductive method of the Englishman, such as the 
publisher and translator of John Stuart Mill, the learned interpreter of Herculean 
documents, Th. Gomperz, in logic, F. Brentano who has affinities of thought with 
A. Bain, in philosophy, the latter transplanted it in his pupils, the author of 
Tonpsychologie, C. Stumpf (now in Halle), A. Marty in Prague, A. Meinong in 
Graz, etc. A new, empirically-minded generation of young thinkers, perhaps more 
than wished for, seems to be developing, as their organ, and at the same time as a 
good sign of a free philosophical movement which can no longer be repressed in 
the future, and which most recently prevail at the University of Vienna on the model 
of the “Philosophical Society” in Berlin (Zimmermann1888-1889, p. 269). 
 
This excerpt sheds new light on Zimmermann’s reservations regarding the designation of 
the Philosophical Society as a “scientific” organization. 
 
4. Brentano’s lecture on Schelling  
Let us now turn to Brentano’s reaction in his lecture on Schelling, which is actually 
composed of two different presentations dating from two different periods. The first is his 
probationary lecture for his habilitation at the University of Würzburg that he defended in 
July 1866; the second was delivered before the Philosophical Society on December 17, 
                                               
25 On A. Günther, see also Zimmermann (1888, pp. 259-264) and Bauer (1966, pp. 80-104).  
 
 
1889 (Brentano 1929c). The circumstances surrounding the writing of the first version are 
well known: one of the jury members, Franz Hoffmann, a disciple of Schelling, had 
imposed that topic on Brentano’s probationary conference entitled “On the main stages in 
the development of Schelling’s philosophy and the scientific value of the last phase of his 
philosophy.” The second lecture incorporates the text of the first version, which he uses 
this time in the context of his controversy with Zimmermann, to whom he refers in this talk 
without referencing him by name but by using his title of President of the Philosophical 
Society, and it pertains to the place of Schelling in the history of philosophy.26 
As I pointed out above, the main stake of this controversy lies in Brentano’s four-phase 
theory and his views on the past and future of philosophy. This theory is based on the idea 
that regularities that can be observed in the course of the history of philosophy since the 
Pre-Socratics obey a law according to which each of the three main periods in the history 
of philosophy evolves according to four distinct phases. The first phase is ascendant, and 
it is characterized by the philosophical orientation of philosophers such as Anaxagoras and 
the Ionian philosophy of nature, Aristotle and Plato in Antiquity, Alexander the Great and 
Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages, or Descartes, Leibniz, and John Locke in modern 
philosophy. Brentano’s theory is based on two criteria: the first is based on the method 
which, according to Brentano’s fourth habilitation thesis, is the inductive method used in 
empirical sciences (Brentano 1895b). The second criterion is based on the primacy of 
theoretical over practical reason or, as Brentano puts it, a philosophy guided preferably by 
theoretical rather than practical interests. Philosophers who meet both of these criteria 
belong to an ascendant phase, like Aristotle, Aquinas, or Locke do, while the philosophers 
who depart from these criteria belong to one of the three declining phases in the history of 
philosophy. We are interested here in the phase of extreme decline which is called 
mysticism, and which is characterized by the invention of artificial means of knowledge 
acquisition and “a mystical elevation of intellectual life.” It favours fantasies about facts. 
Its main advocates are Plotinus and Neoplatonism in Antiquity, Master Eckhart and Nicolas 
de Cues in the Middle Ages, and the partisans of German idealism in modern philosophy, 
                                               
26 In their correspondence from 1889-1890, Brentano and Zimmermann also exchanged views on space, time, 
and causality.  
 
including Schelling. Brentano’s philosophy of history constitutes, somehow, a justification 
for his severe judgment on Schelling's philosophy as paradigmatic of philosophy’s extreme 
decline. 
In his lecture on Schelling, Brentano agrees with Zimmermann that Schelling’s philosophy 
is constructed on fantasies and favours speculation over induction, thus moving philosophy 
away from science and towards the arts (Brentano 1929c, 125). He also agrees with 
Zimmermann that “the near future is just as certainly that of a philosophy of facts as 
Schelling’s time was that of speculations and fantasy” (1929c, p. 123). However, 
Brentano’s reservations concern Zimmermann’s evaluation of this segment of the history 
of philosophy as the golden age of philosophy, particularly in the following quote from 
Zimmermann’s address: 
When I last spoke at this place, gentlemen, the last veteran of that heroic 
philosophical time, the philosophical Proteus, was still alive, and, of fatality it 
seemed, was left out almost to the utmost limit of human existence, in order to show 
himself the changes in the most comprehensive train of thought of modern times. 
[…] I can still see him in front of me, the short man, with his eyes still ardent in old 
age and the powerful forehead, the sardonic smile on his lips over the changing 
time, which once idolized him as a youth and turned away from the man and almost 
mocked the old man as he moved from the faithful silent Munich inebriated with 
art to the doubting, noisy, sober, intellectual Berlin. It was the fate of philosophy 
itself that was depicted in Schelling: marvelled like a prophet, used and needed like 
obedient, persecuted and feared like a harmful instrument, finally laughed and 
sidelined, like a brainless dreamer. That is then what happened to him […]. It is 
worth investigating whether the philosophy itself is to blame for this aversion, or 
more likely it seems, a misguided orientation of philosophy (Zimmermann 1893-
1894, pp. 5-6). 
Note, however, that Zimmermann’s evaluation of Schelling in this excerpt may surprise 
when one considers his sympathy for Herbart’s philosophy and his critical positions 
towards Schelling in his writings on aesthetics, especially in his book Schelling’s 
Philosophie der Kunst (Zimmermann 1875). The question indeed arises whether 
Zimmermann changed his positions in these late writings, a question which I cannot 
address in this study (see Maigné 2017). 
In any case, Brentano clearly dissociates himself from Zimmermann’s evaluation and he 
opposes his own program of philosophy as science, which is at the basis of his theory of 
the four phases (see Fisette forthcoming 2). Brentano argues that the philosophical value 
of this program is immeasurably greater than that of speculative philosophy, which 
historically coincides with its decline (Brentano 1929c, p. 130). That is why Zimmermann 
is wrong in his characterization of Schelling’s philosophy as the heroic time and the golden 
age of philosophy. 
It seems that I am here in strong opposition to our dear president [Zimmermann], 
whom I have been able to so often approve with all my heart. He called this time of 
philosophy the time of its glory, he named it the golden age of philosophy. But the 
opposition should be more apparent than real. Philosophy never shone as much as 
it did at the time, even if it was a superficial and ephemeral shine. And he had the 
right to use the expression “heroic time” if, as I would not doubt, it was for him to 
designate by that the immense personal gifts and the titanic power of the efforts of 
a man who once arose as well as the victories by which they subdued the world 
(1929c, p. 130). 
However, after this modest concession, Brentano turns against Zimmermann the testimony 
of two of his heroes against the philosophy advocated by the idealists, starting with that of 
Herbart himself, who defended a form of realism in reaction to the kind of idealism 
advocated by Schelling, for example, and who once said about this kind of philosophy that 
it was totally lacking in the scientific sobriety required by a rigorous philosophy and that 
it had fallen “into the hands of an inebriated generation” (1929c, p. 130). The second 
testimony is that of the Austrian poet Grillparzer that Zimmermann evokes in his 
presidential address and in memory of whom he founded, with Emil Reich, the Grillparzer 
Society. Against Zimmermann, Brentano quoted Grillparzer’s narrative of a meeting that 
he once had with Hegel: “I found Hegel as enjoyable, understandable, and conciliatory as 
his system then seemed abstruse and intolerant.” And in one of his epigrams, he says, “I 
believe more readily in any miracle, than to such a system (the Hegelian system)” (1929c, 
p. 127). 
Brentano concludes his lecture on Schelling by evoking the quarrel over the name of the 
Philosophical Society, and he strongly denounces the “authoritarian manoeuvres” by which 
the term “scientific” has been deleted from the Society’s program; he warns against the 
direct or indirect influence that Schelling’s and Hegel’s offspring might exert on its 
orientation (1929c, p. 131). Brentano insists everywhere in his Vienna publications that the 
era of a priori construction of grand speculative systems is a bygone era and that the future 
of philosophy belongs only to philosophers engaged in a sublunary philosophy exercised 
in the spirit of empirical sciences. 
 
5. Brentano and Herbart’s philosophical program  
Considering Brentano’s criticism of Zimmermann’s evaluation of Schelling’s philosophy, 
the question arises as to Brentano’s attitude towards Herbart’s philosophical program, 
which represents one of the stakes of his controversy with Zimmermann. This is especially 
so since Brentano does not directly discuss Zimmermann’s works, although he comments 
extensively several aspects of Herbart’s philosophy, especially in his lectures on practical 
philosophy, in which he discusses several aspects of Herbart’s ethics (Brentano 1973).27 
Brentano also discusses several aspects of Herbart’s psychology in Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint. But Brentano is much less critical of Herbart’s ethics28 than he is of 
his psychology. He claims that what is lacking above all in Herbart’s psychology is a 
foundation in experience.29 Brentano nonetheless welcomes Herbart’s efforts to develop 
psychology as a science, although he denounces the arbitrary character of the principles of 
his mathematical psychology (Brentano 1995, p. 50). Brentano imputes some of Herbart’s 
errors to the lack of experimentation in his research and the need for an institute of 
psychology (1895a, pp. 36-37). Moreover, Brentano does not entirely reject the principles 
of Herbart’s psychology, and in particular the equivalent of the fundamental principle of 
Vorstellungsgrundlage, which is clearly formulated in Herbart’s Psychologie als 
Wissenschaft (§ 103). However, Brentano sharply criticizes Herbart’s classification of 
mental phenomena based on the Kantian division between sensibility, intelligence, and 
will, (Brentano 1995, p. 147), his conception of the categorical judgments conceived of, 
after Kant, as synthetic judgments, and he blames him for his substantialist conception of 
the mind (Brentano 1995, p. 127). Brentano (1995, p. 94) also discusses Herbart’s 
                                               
27 It is worth mentioning that the German version of Brentano’s manuscript of these lectures has been much 
abridged by the German editor, and it contains more materials on Brentano’s discussion with Herbart. See 
Ethikkollege, MSS., Eth. 21 (p. 20563–20613), which is is kept in the Houghton Library at Harvard 
University in Harvard. 
28 In The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong (p. IX), Brentano says about Herbart’s ethics: “Still 
his teaching remains in a certain aspect truly related with mine, while, on other sides, other celebrated 
attempts to discover a basis for ethics find in it points of contact” (see also p. 44). 
29 Brentano ironically illustrates his criticism of Herbart through Goethe’s poem entitled Cat-pie: “A cook 
wants to fetch his own game in the forest, but knows little about wildlife; instead of bringing back a hare as 
booty, he goes home with a wild cat. He can apply all the refinements of the most elaborate cuisine: in 
vain!” (1895a, p. 36-37). He then quotes the last two stanzas of Goethe’s poem: 
The cat that’s by the sportsman kill’d 
No cook a hare can render.  
 
treatment of consciousness and its unity in connection with Herbart’s hypothesis of 
unconscious mental phenomena (Herbart 1824-1825, § 199). In this respect, Brentano 
opposes Herbart regarding one of the central theses of his Psychology, namely that all 
mental phenomena are conscious, and discusses, in this context, the infinite regress 
argument (1995, pp. 78-79). 
In his discussion of Herbart’s ethics, Brentano is particularly concerned with two 
principles: on the one hand, Herbart’s main thesis that ethics is a sub-discipline of 
aesthetics understood as a formal discipline (1995, p. 203), and on the other, the thesis that 
“the end is right if the efforts directed towards it are beautiful” (1995, p. 66). Brentano 
discusses this last thesis at length (1995, §37, p.75f.), which he criticizes for not satisfying 
criteria that Brentano imposes on the notion of “right end” namely because this issue is not 
addressed correctly in Herbart’s theory: “Ought I necessarily to endeavor in a beautiful 
manner?” For since beauty is also, for Brentano, a question of feelings and appearance, 
beauty might constitute a motivation, but it cannot be decisive in the face of this question. 
True, Herbart distinguishes in his aesthetic the beautiful from the merely pleasant, and 
therefore between sensory and intellectual feeling or, in Herbart’s own terms, between the 
content of a judgment of taste, which is purely theoretical, and the pleasure or displeasure 
provided by the contemplation of a work of art, for example. But why, then, asks Brentano, 
conceive in a purely theoretical and formal way the object that provides pleasure or 
displeasure to the judgment of taste? Herbart’s answer is that the judgment of taste consists 
solely of relations constructed out of several elements, which taken individually are 
meaningless or indifferent in themselves. This is the central thesis of Herbart’s formalism 
advocated by Zimmermann and according to which relations alone determine beauty, 
whereas primary content and sense feelings are indifferent in this respect. Brentano sums 
up Herbart’s theory as follows: 
Herbart thinks all beauty is based upon relations: each part of what, in combination, 
pleases or displeases, is indifferent, taken in itself. In music, for instance, no one of 
the separate tones, the relations between which form an interval—say a fifth or a 
third that is recognized in music, has by itself anything of the character it takes on 
when they all sound together. Thus, he says, the matter is indifferent; only the form 
determines the judgment of taste (Brentano 1973, p. 76). 
 
Brentano’s main objection against Herbart’s formalism is similar to the one on the basis of 
which he is opposed to British empiricists in his Psychology, and it consists in questioning 
the distinction between sense feelings, which have no object besides themselves, and 
intellectual emotions, which are intentional and have relations as their object. Brentano 
argues that it is not because mere feelings are not about relations that they have no object 
at all. That is why Brentano considers the Herbartian concept of judgment of taste to be 
contradictory insofar as it assimilates two very different things, namely moral and aesthetic 
taste, which, for Brentano, are matters of feelings, and feeling is not judging. It is in this 
sense that Herbart’s judgment of taste transgresses Brentano’s criteria (Brentano 1973, p 
75-76). 
 
6. Zimmermann and the reception of Bolzano in Austria 
Another important aspect of Zimmermann’s contribution to the history of philosophy in 
Austria lies in his role in the reception and transmission of Bolzano’s ideas there. We saw 
that Zimmermann granted Bolzano a special status in the history of philosophy in 
nineteenth-century Austria, and we have emphasized that he himself contributed in several 
ways to the diffusion of Bolzano’s ideas in the country. In this regard, several 
commentators of Zimmermann (Winter 1933, 1976; Morscher 1997; Künne 1999) have 
emphasized the importance of his Philosophical Propaedeutic as the textbook 
commissioned by the Ministry of Education after the education reform aimed at teaching 
the two main philosophical disciplines in most high schools in Austria, namely logic and 
psychology.30 The first edition of the volume on logic was so influenced by Bolzano that 
some careful readers of Bolzano even accused him of plagiarism (Winter 1976; Morscher 
1997). Be that as it may, it is through their philosophical training in Austrian high schools 
that several philosophers and scientists have been in touch with the basics of Bolzano’s 
logic. For example, Twardowski (2017, p. 2), like most high school students in Austria, 
                                               
30 Hence the division of Zimmermann’s propaedeutic into two parts: the first deals with psychology and it 
was published in 1852, while the second is on logic and it was published the following year. It is the latter 
volume on logic whose content is largely inspired by Bolzano’s Wissenschaftslehre (see Morscher, p. 161-
165). However, the later editions of Zimmnerman’s Propaedeutics have been thoroughly reworked along the 
lines of Herbart’s philosophy.  
was introduced to philosophy via Zimmermann’s Propaedeutics.31 Most of Brentano’s 
students32 also significantly contributed to the dissemination of Bolzano’s ideas: the most 
important are Benno Kerry (1885-1891), who influenced Twardowski (1894; 1999c, p. 
24),33 and Husserl, who, during the 1890s, in working manuscripts, lectures, and in Logical 
Investigations, specifically in relation to logical psychologism, paid much attention to 
Bolzano’s philosophy.34 
That being said, there is also a lesser-known aspect of Zimmermann’s contribution to the 
reception of Bolzano in Austria, which is once again related to the Philosophical Society 
and which also involves Brentano’s students. That episode begins with the rediscovery in 
1903 of Bolzano’s manuscripts, which Zimmermann inherited after Bolzano’s death and 
which he had discreetly deposited at the library of the Vienna Academy of Sciences without 
mentioning their value, especially of Bolzano’s unpublished mathematical writings.35 An 
excerpt from a report of the Philosophical Society dated from 1902-1903 summarizes the 
circumstances of this rediscovery by the members of the Society:36 
We still have to commemorate a bibliographical event, which could lead to a 
scientific achievement of outstanding importance for the Philosophical Society if 
everything goes as we wish thereafter. It was known to some members of the [...] 
Society that manuscripts from Bernhard Bolzano (1781 to 1848) were in the 
                                               
31 Although the late version of Zimmermann’s propaedeutic was severely criticized by Meinong and Höfler 
because of its Herbartian content (see Coen, 2007), it appears that Höfler’s textbook, which replaced that of 
Zimmermann in the late 1880s, partially replicates the Bolzanian content of Zimmermann’s textbook, which 
he integrates into Brentano’s descriptive psychology framework (see Uebel 2000, p. 133). According to 
Uebel, Höfler’s textbook would have exercised an influence on the Austrian members of the Vienna Circle 
comparable to that exercised by Zimmermann’s Propaedeutics in circulating Bolzano’s ideas (Uebel 2000, 
p. 109). 
32 Brentano himself taught Bolzano’s Paradoxes of the Infinite in his 1884-1885 lectures in Vienna, although, 
as his correspondence with H. Bergmann shows, he always deplored Bolzano’s influence on his own students: 
“Daraufhin ist es nun geschehen, dass Meinong sowohl und Twardowski als Husserl und Kerry, der allerdings 
auch mehr von mir als von Zimmermann beeinflusst worden ist und sich, nachdem er schon lange Wien 
verlassen, noch in den letzten Jahren vor seinem fruehen Tod in brieflichen Verkehr mit mir setzte, in das 
Studium von Bolzano vertieften. […] Aber die Verantwortung fuer so vieles Absonderliche und Absurde, 
wozu sowohl Meinong aIs Husserl unter Beruecksichtigung von Bolzano gelangt sind, darf ich doch 
vollstaendig ablehnen. Und wie gesagt, wie ich selbst von Bolzano nie auch nur einen einzigen Satz 
entnommen habe, so habe ich auch niemals meinen Schuelern glaubhaft gemacht, dass sie dort eine wahre 
Bereicherung ihrer philosophischen Erkenntnis gewinnen würden” (Brentano 1946, p. 125-126; Bergmann 
1909, 1966). 
33 At the very beginning of this book (1894, p.15), Twardowski credits Bolzano and Zimmermann for the 
distinction between content and object of presentations.  
34 Husserl 2001; 1994a; 1975. Husserl claims to have “rediscovered” Bolzano’s philosophy (1975, p. 37). 
35 Morscher (1997, p. 180f.) calls into question Zimmermann’s contribution to the dissemination of Bolzano’s 
ideas, mainly because of his negligence in the management of this valuable heritage. 
36 See also Kreibig 1914, p. 276; Höfler 1921, pp. 10-11; Winter 1933, p. 218. 
possession of the chairman and honorary president of the Philosophical Society, Dr. 
Robert von Zimmermann. Since this tradition almost threatened to break down, the 
board of the Society, at the beginning of this year, was keen to investigate the 
remaining of those precious manuscripts. After many unsuccessful attempts […], a 
very comprehensive compilation of Bolzano’s original manuscripts, whose content 
is partly philosophical but mainly mathematical, was in the Imperial Library. The 
Society’s secretary, Robert von Sterneck, has subjected these unordered 
manuscripts to an examination, which already allows to reasonably estimate the 
size of the collection. For example, there was nothing less than a ready-to-print 
manuscript of a “theory of function” that testifies to a surprising degree of the 
actuality of his views. And these investigations, among others, are still unpublished 
fifty-five years after the author’s death! Throughout this long period of time, 
however, until recently there were significant indications in Anton Marty’s 
rectorate speech not to ignore the reminders to the effect that it would be worthwhile 
to give the outstanding thinker of Austria the only worthy monument by printing 
Bolzano’s writings. Bolzano’s relations with the longstanding chairman of the 
Society Zimmermann prompted the Philosophical Society to do everything in its 
power to contribute to the realization of that old wish cherished by so many” 
(Jahresbericht 1902-1903, pp. 6-7). 
It was as a result of this discovery that Höfler and other members of the Society took steps 
to prepare the edition of Bolzano’s manuscripts and to reissue his main works.37 However, 
Höfler’s project was delayed in part due to his moving to Prague in 1903.38  
The next important step in the reception of Bolzano in Vienna is the creation of a Bolzano 
Commission on March 9, 1914 by the members of the Philosophical Society. A few months 
earlier, Höfler presented to his colleagues and several members of the Society 
(Jahresberichte 1912-1913, p.10) a draft of this commission project whose mandate was 
both to make known the works of the philosopher and to support the growing interest at 
that time for the father of Austrian philosophy.39 Höfler highlighted the importance of the 
rediscovery of Bolzano’s manuscripts in 1903 and the many initiatives undertaken by 
                                               
37 It should be noted that well before the rediscovery of these manuscripts, Marty announced, in 1896, in his 
address as Rector of the German University in Prague, the establishment of a Bolzano Foundation in the 
German and the Czech University, whose primary mandate was to prepare a new edition of Bolzano’s works 
(Marty 1916, p. 91; Künne 1997, p. 57). Hugo Bergmann, the author of an important book on Bolzano 
(Bergmann 1909) and a student of Brentano and Marty, also took steps to publish Bolzano’s 
Wissenschaftslehre (see Künne 1999, p. 58). 
38 Once in Prague, Höfler became a member of the Deutsche Förderungsgesellschaft für Wissenschaft und 
Kunst, which enabled him to obtain some of the financial support for his publication project (see Winter 
1976, p. 29) despite Marty’s opposition in the commission in charge of the evaluation of Höfler’s application 
(see Marty’s letter to Brentano from February 19, 1905; Gimpl 1999, p. 20-21). 
39 According to Article 1 of the Statutes and Regulations of the Bolzano Commission, its main mandate was 
“Neudrücke der Werke Bernard Bolzanos zu veranstalten und die noch ungedruckten Schriften desselben 
herauszugeben”. 
Brentano’s students and some members of the Society to promote the innovative nature of 
Bolzano’s thought and the value of his philosophical ideas: 
If I allowed myself to mention the establishment of a Bolzano Commission in the 
Philosophical Society, it is first and foremost to prevent that this interest in the great 
Austrian philosopher disappears and that it will grow in a sustainable way [...] It is 
sufficient for the moment to emphasize that the Philosophical Society of the 
University of Vienna, by what it does for the work of Bolzano, now wishes to pay 
homage to him in the name of a philosophical society (Jahresberichte 1912-1913, 
p. 14). 
 
In the year of the foundation of the Bolzano Commission, the Society published the first 
volume of Wissenschaftslehre40 along with an article by Kreibig (1914) on the reception of 
Bolzano in Austria.41 Kreibig argues that even though Bolzano’s philosophy was once 
ignored at the time by his contemporaries because they were “intoxicated by dialectics,”42 
Bolzano remains the first Austrian thinker who deserves the name: 
So, it would seem that the history of philosophy in the last century on the soil of 
Austria was not a truly significant phenomenon unless it has a thinker in Bernard 
Bolzano, whose universality, depth, and acuteness deserve far more scientific 
admiration than so many glittering poetical thoughts of his deified contemporaries 
(Kreibig 1914, p. 274). 
To celebrate this occasion, one of the most loyal members of this organization since its 
founding, K. Twardowski, was invited to give a talk at the general meeting of the same 
year. Twardowski’s two-part talk served as a basis for one of his most important 
philosophical treatises, “Actions and Products” (Twardowski 1999a), in which he 
conceives of intentional content on the model of Stumpf’s Gebilde and Bolzano’s Sätze an 
sich.43 Twardowski’s main concern in this talk is logical psychologism and Husserl’s 
                                               
40 Bolzano 1914. In 1920, the Society published Bolzano’s Paradoxien des Unendlichen with H. Hahn’s 
annotations (Bolzano 1920), and the four volumes of Wissenschaftslehre were reissued several years later by 
Höfler’s student W. Schultz, who was also a member of the Bolzano Commission (Bolzano 1929-1931). 
 
41 See also Kreibig (1905, p. 375f.), who insists on the importance of the Bolzanian distinction between 
content and object of presentation and its usage by Husserl, Höfler, Twardowski, Meinong, G. Uphues, the 
young Zimmermann, Kerry, and himself. 
42 Kreibig offers an explanation of Bolzano’s historical situation based on Brentano’s four phases theory: 
“Bolzano war in Wahrheit um mehr als ein Menschenalter zu früh gekommen, um nach Verdienst gewürdigt 
zu werden. Seine Zeit war die des dialektischen Rausches, der blendenden Paradoxie, der mystischen Phrase. 
In solchen Epochen wird ein Denker von Bolzanos Art hochmütig ignoriert, wenn nicht verspottet” (Kreibig 
1914, p. 287). 
43 Twardowski took over the main distinction between action (Function) and product (Gebilde) from another 
student of Brentano, Carl Stumpf (1906a, b), who also significantly contributed to the reception of Bolzano 
in Germany. See Fisette forthcoming 1. 
objections against Twardowski’s psychologizing conception of meaning and intentional 
content in his 1894 book (Ingarden, 1948, pp. 28-29). Twardowski’s talk raised so much 
interest from the members of the Society that two further discussion sessions were added 
on this occasion.  
 
7. Zimmermann’s legacy in Vienna 
In 1895, Brentano resentfully left Austria, after having waited in vain for 15 years as a 
private lecturer, and despite the efforts of Zimmermann and his colleagues of the Faculty 
of philosophy, for Brentano’s reappointment as a full professor. However, Höfler 
considered that the hiring of Mach to replace Brentano, and later, of Jodl, an affront to 
Brentano (Höfler 1917, p. 325). In fact, Zimmermann initially disagreed with the 
Minister’s recommendation to grant Brentano’s chair to Mach, but he later rallied by 
proposing a compromise which is summarized in this excerpt: 
In Ernst Mach one has an epistemologist based on inductive and experimental 
methods. With Jodl, there is now a representative of ethics and history of modern 
philosophy. In the classical philologist Theodor Gomperz [the father of the future 
professor of philosophy Heinrich Gomperz] one has a representative of ancient 
philosophy. It is now necessary to make room for Christian philosophy. In any case, 
Müllner, who was attended by many students of the faculty of philosophy at the 
theological faculty, should represent the philosophy of the Middle Ages 
(Zimmermann, quoted in Wieser 1950, p. 39). 
But this is not the only decision taken by the ministry after Brentano’s departure that had 
direct consequences on the orientation of philosophy in Vienna. In 1896, Friedrich Jodl, 
known for his anticlerical positions, and his antidote, the theologian L. Müllner, were 
appointed in Vienna not only to fill Zimmermann’s chair but also to counterbalance the 
hiring of Mach the previous year. Jodl was also known for his resolutely anti-Brentanian 
positions and his many manoeuvres aimed at breaking the monopoly of Brentano’s students 
in Austrian universities.44 As Höfler pointed out in his autobiography, Jodl’s main mission, 
when he left Prague, was to eradicate from Austria this provincial clique of priests or 
former priests whom he called the Brentanoids: 
                                               
44 Jodl’s career is closely related to Brentano’s students. He moved to Prague in 1884 to replace C. Stumpf 
and became a colleague of Marty and Masaryk; in 1896, he was appointed in Vienna to fill Zimmermann’s 
chair, and he was himself replaced in Prague by another student of Brentano, C. von Ehrenfels, who was also 
very active in the Philosophical Society. 
The philosophy at the German university is occupied and dominated in turn by the 
clericals, more precisely, “Brentanoide” or “Brentanote,” as he calls them: the 
“clique” of a fashionable philosophy which retreats in its “provincial seclusion” - 
that is Jodl’s view at any rate - with his rotten compromise between a “research 
without presupposition” and the deeply suspicious reactionary of a “liberal 
theology” (Höfler 1892, p. 16; see Gimpl 1999). 
 
Jodl’s crusade against Brentano and his followers was carried out on several fronts, 
particularly in the Philosophical Society, which Jodl chaired after Höfler’s departure for 
Prague in 1903 and until 1912 (Fisette 2014). 
After Müllner’s death in 1911 and Jodl’s in 1913, the department appointed Robert 
Reininger as extraordinary professor in Vienna, and in 1922 as ordinary professor, the same 
year as K. Bühler and M. Schlick. Reininger was a student of Zimmermann who defended 
a dissertation on Schopenhauer in 1903 and was one of the few advocates of Kantianism 
in Vienna (see Nawratil 1998, 1969). Reininger became a member of the Philosophical 
Society at the turn of the twentieth century, and under Jodl’s presidency, with whom he 
was rather close, he became Vice President between 1906-1912, and after Höfler’s death 
in 1922, he took over the chairmanship of the Philosophical Society until its dissolution in 
1938. 
Under Reininger’s lead, the Philosophical Society underwent profound transformations 
which would later have as a consequence the distortion of the initial vocation of the 
organization. Indeed, Reininger virtually abolished discussion time in the Society, which 
means, at the same time, also its democratic character. He also reduced to a minimum the 
number of lectures delivered by scientists and non-philosophers, thus minimizing the 
interdisciplinary vocation of the Society, and abandoned the main projects dear to his 
predecessors, namely, that of the Bolzano Commission. In short, under his chairmanship, 
the society became just an organization among others, and it was quickly supplanted in 
Vienna by the Ernst Mach Verein, and later by the Vienna Circle. The final phase of the 
decline of the Philosophical Society was its annexation to the Kant-Gesellschaft, which 
Reininger celebrated on November 18, 1927.45 
                                               
45 “On November 18, 1927 was held, under the presidency of Professor Robert Reininger in Vienna, the 
general meeting of the “Philosophical Society” during which the “Philosophical Society,” to the request of 
the commission, was acknowledged as a local group of the Kantian Society. From now on, it will bear the 
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